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Through the Looking
Glass Darkly:
Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft and
Second Collision Liability
David J. Stout, JD.
David Stout is a lawyer with the Carpenter Law Offices whose
practice includes products liability. He is a 1982 honors
graduate of the University of New Mexico School of Law.

"By the pricking of my thumbs,
Something wicked this way comes:1

There is a tendency these days during the Republican
fin de siecle for the plaintiffs'
bar to experience a distinct itch
ing of the thumbs when slog
ging through product liability
cases from the federal circuit
courts.
The Tenth Circuit in
Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft
Corporation2, held that New
Mexico law requires a fact find
er to compare the negligence of
a manufacturer for its failure to
design or manufacture a crash
worthy vehicle with the origi
nal tortfeasor's negligence in
causing the accident to occur.
David J. Stout
This holding is in direct conflict with the analysis for the tort of crashworthiness articulated
by the New Mexico Court of Appeals in Duran v. General
Motors Corporation3 and operates to undermine the funda
mental social policies which formed the basis for the tort of
crashworthiness. A thorough understanding of the Tenth
Circuit's opinion, which is not binding on New Mexico state
courts, and the reasons why the court misconstrued New Mexico
(Continued on Page 158)

The New Mexico Court of Appeals
Experiments With
Satellite Offices
Will Murphy, J.D.
Will Murphy is currently clerking for Court of Appeals Judge
Pamela Minzner and has recently been admitted to practice
in New Mexico.

In 1990, the New Mexico legislature approved funding
for a satellite office of the Court of Appeals in Albuquerque.
The lease started on April 1, 1990, but Chief Judge Joseph
Alarid of the New Mexico Court
of Appeals insists that the
court's Albuquerque satellite
office did not open on April
Fool's Day. "That was just the
day that the money became
available. The office opened
on the second." The Albuquer
que office is in the former State
Bar Building, next to the UNM
Law School. The court also
has a satellite office in Las
Cruces.
As the Albuquerque
Will Murphy
office has no personnel from
the clerk's office, filings must still be made in Santa Fe. The
court tried to get funding so that it could begin accepting filings
(Continued on Page 154)
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law is essential for the successful prosecution of a crash
worthiness case.
BACKGROUND ON CRASHWORTHINESS
The doctrine of "crashworthiness" or "second collision"4
received its judicial baptism in the landmark case of Larsen
v. General Motors Corporation.5 The Larsen court conclud
ed that a manufacturer owes a duty to design and manufacture
a "crashworthy" vehicle because automobile accidents are a
fact of life, and therefore entirely foreseeable.6 Larsen stands
for the essential proposition that a person who sustains injuries
or whose injuries are enhanced by the breach of the manufac
turer's duty to produce a crashworthy vehicle is entitled to
recover for those injuries over and above what would have been
sustained in the initial collision.

An automobile manufacturer owes a duty to
design and manufacture a "crashworthy"
vehicle because automobile accidents are a
fact of life and therefore entirely forseeable.
New Mexico has followed the great majority of juris
dictions and adopted the doctrine of crashworthiness. In Duran
v. General Motors Corporation,7 the Court of Appeals held
that design defects8 which enhance injuries are actionable, even
if the defect did not cause the initial collision. "The fact that
the defect does not cause the initial collision or impact should
make no difference if it causes or enhances the ultimate in
jury. "9
There are two noteworthy points about the Duran opin
ion which are important for a full understanding of the Cleve
land case. First, the Court of Appeals in Duran adopted a
negligence standard for an injury-causing or injury-enhancing
design defect. 10 The holding that a crashworthiness claim
sounds in negligence rather than strict liability allowed the
Cleveland court to conclude that New Mexico's regime of pure
comparative negligence requires a comparison of the relative
fault of the initial tortfeasors and the manufacturing tortfeasor.
Second, the Duran court required that a plaintiff prove by
specific evidence or testimony the extent of enhanced injury
caused by the design defect.11 The Court of Appeals adopted
the three requirements for proof of proximate cause set out in
Huddell v. Levin. 12 The plaintiff must prove that: (1) the
defective design caused injuries over and above those which
otherwise would have been sustained; (2) the specific degree
or extent of the enhanced injury; 13 (3) what injuries, if any,
would have resulted had the alternative, safer design been
used. 14 In addition, plaintiff must offer some method of estab
lishing the extent of enhanced injuries attributable to the design
defect. 15
The Duran court's requirement of specific proof that the
design or production defect caused the injuries attributable to
the second collision is significant for the purposes of under158

standing the flawed analysis in Cleveland. Because the Duran
court so carefully crafted the requirements relating to pro of of
the second collision injury, a plaintiff must exclude the initial
collision as a cause of the injuries.
Proof of the second
collision claim under New Mexico law necessarily excludes
fault of the original tortfeasors in causing the second collision
injuries since by definition, the second collision claim can only
be established with specific evidence that the design or pro•
duction defect caused the plaintiff's injuries or enhanced the
injuries caused by the initial collision. Given this regime, the
Cleveland court's conclusion that New Mexico law requires
the comparison of fault between the initial and second collision
tortfeasors constitutes a gross misreading of the Duran opin•
ion.
CLEVELAND V. PIPER AIRCRAFT
The facts of Cleveland involved the crash of a Piper
Super Cub at the Los Lunas airport. The Piper was pulling
a glider, piloted by Robert Mudd, which was to be photo•
graphed for a commercial. The front seat of the Piper had been
removed and a camera mounted to the 15ase of the removed front
seat to photograph the glider for the commercial. The pilot
of the Piper would control the plane from the rear seat. The
rear seats had seat-belts, but no shoulder harness.
Cleveland was the pilot of the Piper and employed as
a glider tow pilot for High Valley Soaring. He and his empl oyer
had been involved in an ongoing dispute with the owner of the
Los Lunas airport, John Wood. The dispute centered around
the glider operations' compliance with FAA rules and regu
lations. In fact, Wood had closed the airport the day before
the accident by blocking the runway with several parked vehicles.
Two days before the accident Wood had stopped Cleveland
from taking off at the airport by parking his van crosswi se
across the end of the runway. A court hearing on the dispute
was scheduled the day of the accident.

Cleveland proceeded to trial on two theories
ofdesign negligence: Negligence whichprox
imately caused the initial collision and neg
ligence which proximately caused the sec
ond collision.
On the day of the accident, Wood again blocked the end
of the runway with his van. The Piper, pulling the glider,
collided with the van on take-off. Cleveland, who was piloting
the plane, sustained serious brain injuries when his head struck
the camera mounted in the front seat.
Cleveland sued Piper Aircraft. The case proceeded to
trial on two theories of design negligence. First, inadequate
visibility from the rear pilot's seat as a proximate cause of the
initial collision; and second, the lack of a shoulder harness for
the rear pilot's seat, the second collision theory. The jury
apportioned fault among the parties under each of the two
. theories. Significantly, however, the jury found that 100% of
Cleveland's injuries were attributable to the lack of shoulder
(Continued on Page 159)

The New Mexico Trial Lawyer

July-August, 1991

Through The Looking Glass - Con 't. from Front Page

law is essential for the successful prosecution of a crash
worthiness case.
BACKGROUND ON CRASHWORTHINESS

The doctrine of "crashworthiness" or "second collision"4
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dictions and adopted the doctrine of crashworthiness. In Duran
v. General Motors Corporation,7 the Court of Appeals held
that design defects8 which enhance injuries are actionable, even
if the defect did not cause the initial collision. "The fact that
the defect does not cause the initial collision or impact should
make no difference if it causes or enhances the ultimate in
jury." 9
There are two noteworthy points about the Duran opin
ion which are important for a full understanding of the Cleve
land case. First, the Court of Appeals in Duran adopted a
negligence standard for an injury-causing or injury-enhancing
design defect. 10 The holding that a crashworthiness claim
sounds in negligence rather than strict liability allowed the
Cleveland court to conclude that New Mexico's regime of pure
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standing the flawed analysis in Cleveland. Because the Duran
court so carefully crafted the requirements relating to proof of
the second collision injury, a plaintiff must exclude the initial
collision as a cause of the injuries.
Proof of the second
collision claim under New Mexico law necessarily excludes
fault of the original tortfeasors in causing the second collision
injuries since by definition, the second collision claim can only
be established with specific evidence that the design or pro
duction defect caused the plaintiff's injuries or enhanced the
injuries caused by the initial collision. Given this regime, the
Cleveland court's conclusion that New Mexico law requires
the comparison of fault between the initial and second collision
tortfeasors constitutes a gross misreading of the Duran opin
ion.
CLEVELAND V. PIPER AIRCRAFT

The facts of Cleveland involved the crash of a Piper
Super Cub at the Los Lunas airport. The Piper was pulling
a glider, piloted by Robert Mudd, which was to be photo
graphed for a commercial. The front seat of the Piper had been
removed and a camera mounted to the base of the removed front
seat to photograph the glider for the commercial. The pilot
of the Piper would control the plane from the rear seat. The
rear seats had seat-belts, but no shoulder harness.
Cleveland was the pilot of the Piper and employed as
a glider tow pilot for High Valley Soaring. He and his employer
had been involved in an ongoing dispute with the owner of the
Los Lunas airport, John Wood. The dispute centered around
the glider operations' compliance with FAA rules and regu
lations. In fact, Wood had closed the airport the day before
the accident by blocking the runway with several parked vehicles,
Two days before the accident Wood had stopped Cleveland
from taking off at the airport by parking his van crosswise
across the end of the runway. A court hearing on the dispute
was scheduled the day of the accident.

Cleveland proceeded to trial on two theories
of design negligence: Negligence which prox
imately caused the initial collision and neg
ligence which proximately caused the sec
ond collision.
On the day of the accident, Wood again blocked the end
of the runway with his van. The Piper, pulling the glider,
collided with the van on take-off. Cleveland, who was piloting
the plane, sustained serious brain injuries when his head struck
the camera mounted in the front seat.
Cleveland sued Piper Aircraft. The case proceeded to
trial on two theories of design negligence. First, inadequate
visibility from the rear pilot's seat as a proximate cause of the
initial collision; and second, the lack of a shoulder harness for
the rear pilot's seat, the second collision theory. The jury
apportioned fault among the parties under each of the two
. theories. Significantly, however, the jury found that 100% of
Cleveland's injuries were attributable to the lack of shoulder
(Continued on Page 159)

The New Mexico Trial Lawyer

July-August, 1991

Through The Looking Glass - Con 't. from Page 158

harness. The special verdict form also indicated, however, that
the design negligence as to inadequate forward visibility was
a proximate cause of Cleveland's injuries and damages.16
The jury found that with regard to the lack of the shoul
der harness Piper was 91.6 % at fault and Cleveland was 8.4%
at fault. With regard to the rear seat visibility theory, the jury
apportioned fault as follows: Piper - 41.7 %, Cleveland 42.5%, Mudd-15.8%, Wood-0. The district court entered
judgment against Piper based on the 41.7% finding, despite
the jury's conclusion that 100% of the injuries to Cleveland
were caused by the lack of a shoulder harness.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court on the basis
that the jury should have been permitted to compare the fault
of the initial and second collision tortfeasors.17 The court held
that New Mexico law18 required that "as to that portion of
damages for which the original tortfeasors and the crashwor
thiness tortfeasors are concurrent tortfeasors, i.e., damages
attributable to the enhanced injuries, only, the negligence of
all of the tortfeasors,and of the Plaintiff, must be compared." 19
In other words, the Tenth Circuit interpreted the New Mexico
law of crashworthiness and comparative negligence to require
that the negligence of any party proximately causing any
enhanced injury must be compared including any of the orig
inal tortfeasors that caused the accident in the first place.

The Tenth Circuit's decision is fundamen
tally flawed and represents an unfortunate
misreading of Duran.
Stated in this manner the opinion sounds so reasonable
and would appear to comport with New Mexico's system of
pure comparative fault. And yet, the decision is fundamentally
flawed. The second collision tort by definition is limited to
injuries caused by or enhanced by the product defect, that is
only those injuries resulting from the second collision. The
Duran court held, as indeed the Tenth Circuit recognized,20
that the tort of crashworthiness as recognized in New Mexico
assumes that the injury is divisible. It is a gross misreading
ofDuran to conclude,as did the Tenth Circuit, that the original
tortfeasor's negligence in causing the accident may be com
pared against the manufacturer's design negligence. Why?
Because such a result requires perforce the assumption that the
initial injury is indivisible, that the first collision tortfeasor's
negligence carries over to contribute to the second collision
injuries. The unanswered conumdrum is how to compare the
degree of an indivisible injury caused by the original tort
feaser's negligence with the second collision injuries caused
by the crashworthiness tortfeaser's design negligence.21
Part of the difficulty in parsing the Cleveland opinion
is that the court appears to give contradictory instructions to
the district court on remand.22 On the one hand, the court
appears to hold that if the evidence is uncontroverted that no
injuries would have occurred as a result of the first collision,
July-August, 1991

then "no issue is presented for the jury to determine what
injuries and damages were proximately caused by the negli
gence of the original tortfeasors."23 So far so good. In the
very next sentence, however, the court appears to hold that
the jury must compare the relative fault of all parties and non
parties whose conduct proximately causes the enhanced injury,
whether the party or non-party is an "original tortfeasor" or
the design tortfeasor.24

The initial tortfeasor's negligence cannot
be compared with the second collision tort
feasor's negligence.
The court's holding that initial and second coll ision
tortfeasers' negligence must be compared is based on a faulty
application of New Mexico law and is sure to create tremen
dous confusion for the jury. The opinion misconstrued New
Mexico law in a number of respects. The court disregarded
the express statement in Duran that, because the second col
lision tort is concerned only with the injuries proximately
caused by the design defect, "the concurrent tortfeasor concept
is not applicable." 25 Despite this clear statement, the Tenth
Circuit found that "the logical extension of Bartlett to the case
before this Court"26 was to require straight comparison of fault.
The logical fallacy here is that if the initial tortfeasor caused
the additional injuries, then there is no injury enhanced by the
design defect and the plaintiff has failed to prove an element
of the second collision tort. It is for this reason that the Duran
court properly recognized that in the context of crashworthi
ness the original and second collision tortfeasors' negligence
cannot be concurrent and therefore logically should not be
compared.
Duran was decided long after New Mexico's adoption
of comparative fault and there is not the slightest indication
in the decision that the initial collision tortfeasor's negligence
should be compared to the crashworthiness tortfeasor's design
negligence.27 The reason for this omission is almost certainly
because the Duran court focused on the divisibility of injury
and the requirement that a plaintiff prove the design defect
"causes or enhances the ultimate injury." Duran, 101 N.M. at
745.28

The Tenth Circuit also grounded its conclusion in a
group of New Mexico cases that, taken as a whole, stand for
the simple proposition that an initial tortfeasor may be liable
for a successive act of negligence, if that successive act of
negligence was foreseeable. See Martinez v. First National
Bank of Albuquerque, 107 N.M. 268,755 P.2d 606 (Ct. App.
1987); Vaca v. Whitaker, 86 N.M. 79,519 P.2d 315 (Ct. App.
1974). Of course the design negligence that causes the second
collision injury does not succeed the original collision; rather
it antedates the accident-causing event and, as recognized by
the Duran court, results in an injury separate and apart from
the initial collision. Indeed,to allow comparison of an original
tortfeasor's negligence in causing the accident with the man
ufacturer's design negligence based on Martinez or Vaca is
t�tmount to holding that the original tortfeasor should have
(Continued on Page 160)
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foreseen the design failure which enhanced the injuries. This
is a true perversion of the crashworthiness doctrine.

of defective designs to parties other than the manufacturer. As
Justice Traynor recognized long ago, the "purpose [of products
liability] ...is to insure that the costs of the injuries resulting
from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that
put such products on the market rather than by the injured
persons who are powerless to protect themselves."31

What is so confounding about the Tenth Circuit's anal
ysis is its complete disregard for the public policies which
underlie the tort of crashworthiness. A federal court making
an "Erie guess" must consider the entire body of a state's law
which, in the case of New Mexico, finds strong support for
limiting the comparison of second collision fault to the man
ufacturer. The New Mexico Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that it will interpret the laws of this state to keep the
highways safe for the motoring public.29 There is also the
explicit recognition of the Duran court that the inevitability
of automobile accidents gives rise to a manufacturer's duty to
use "reasonable care in the design of its vehicle to avoid
subjecting the user to an unreasonable risk of injury in the event
of a collision. "30 The focus on the manufacturer for design
responsibility is eminently practical because the manufacturer
is the party best able to control the potential risks through the
design of a reasonably safe vehicle. The Cleveland opinion,
because it shifts the focus away from the manufacturer's re
sponsibility for causing enhanced injuries, undermines the very
purpose of the tort in the first place.

The case is binding in federal court, but with all due
respect to stare decisis, plaintiffs should not be deterred from
asking the federal district court to reexamine the issue in light
of a more comprehensive analysis of New Mexico law. Allowing
a comparision of fault between the original tortfeasor and the
design tortfeasor for the enhanced injuries is in direct conflict
with the entire theory underlying the crashworthiness doctrine
and results in a distortion of the law as articulated by New
Mexico's appellate courts. In addition, such a comparison is
itself redundant of the requirements for a recovery in a crash
worthiness case, that is a party can only recover for that part
of the injuries which were enhanced by the design defect.

There is another compelling reason why the Tenth Circuit
opinion should not be followed by New Mexico's courts. The
approach set forth by the court shifts some portion of the risk

Plaintiffs must be prepared, however, to litigate a second
collision case against all of the original tortfeasors and cannot
afford to simply focus their case on the manufacturer.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
What to do about Cleveland? 32 Fortunately the court's
"Erie guess" is not binding on state courts. Until such time
as the New Mexico. appellate courts address this issue the
Cleveland opinion carries no precedential value in state court.

END NOTES
1. Shakespeare, W., Macbeth, Act IV, Scene l, The Complete Works of
William Shakespeare 1016 (P. Alexander ed. 1951).

design crashworthiness theory is at times confusing. This article uses design
or manufacturing defects only in reference to crashworthiness theories.

2. 890 F.2d 1540 (10th Cir. 1989).

9. Id. at 745.

3. 101 N.M. 742, 688 P.2d 779 (Ct. App. 1983).

l 0. This result was by no means a foregone conclusion. Other courts have
grounded the crashworthiness doctrine in strict products liability and breach
of warranty theories. See generally Annot. "Liability of Manufacturer, Seller
or Distributor of Motor Vehicle for Defect which Merely Enhances Injury from
Accident Otherwise Caused" 42 A. L. R. 3d 560 (1972).

4. The description "second collision" is sometimes applied to this theory of
liability. It describes injuries or enhanced injury that occurred not as a result
of the initial collision itself, but resulted subsequent to initial collision because
of a design defect or manufacturing failure. At its simplest the "second
collision" is the impact of the occupant of the occupant with some part of
the vehicle, a crushed roof for example, which would not have occurred absent
a design or manufacturing defect. The terms "second collision" and "crash·
worthiness" are used synonymously in this article. See MIiler v. Tood, 551
N.E. 2d 1139, 1140 n. l (Ind. 1990) (containing a concise description of the
theory).

6. The duty requires that a manufacturer "use reasonable care in the design
of its vehicle to avoid subjecting the user to an unreasonable risk of injury
in the event of a collision." Larsen, 391 F.2d at 502. The duty is founded
upon the recognition that "[c]ollisions with or without fault of the user are
clearly foreseeable by the manufacturer and are statistically inevitable." Id.
More importantly. the duty expresses a fundamental policy determination that
automobiles should provide not just transportation, but "safe transportation
or as safe as is reasonably possible under the present state of the art." Id.
(emphasis added).

11. There was a split among the authorities whether plaintiff had to prove
enhanced injury with specificity or, following the principles of the RESTATE·
MENT (SECOND) OP TORTS §§ 433, 433A, 433B, need not prove "the nature and
extent of the enhanced injuries,but rather makes a submissible case by offering
enough evidence of enhancement to present a jury issue [The "substantial
factor" test]. [Under the substantial factor test] [d]efendants are deemed
concurrent tortfeasors because their independent acts combine to cause a single
injury. Under this theory, plaintiff has the burden of presenting sufficient
evidence to prove to the jury that each defendant's act (the original tortfeasor
and the manufacturer's defective product) was a substantial factor in producing
plaintiff's injuries. Should plaintiff's injuries be indivisible, the defendants
are held jointly and severally liable as concurrent tortfeasors for plaintiff's
total damages." Richardson v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 552 F. Supp. 73, 80
(W.D. Mo. 1982); Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 669 F.2d 1199 ()8th
Cir. 1982); see generally Annot. "Products Liability: Sufficiency of Proof of
Injuries Resulting from (Second Collision)" 9 A.L.R. 4th 494 (1981). As n oted
in the text, New Mexico did not follow this approach, but requires specific
proof of enhanced injury.

7. 101 N.M. 742, 688 P.2d 779 (Ct. App. 1983) (emphasis added).

12. 537 F.2d 726 (3rd Cir. 1976).

8. The Cleveland case included a product liability claim for negligent design
as the causative factor in the initial collision. This claim was independent of
the crashworthiness theory. The court's discussion of "design defect" which
included both a negligent design as the cause of the accident and a negligent

13. The Huddell court's proximate cause requirements for a crashworthiness
case have been criticized for creating an impossible standard of proof. See,

5. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
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e.g., McDowell v.

Kawaski Motors Corp. USA, 799 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. Ct.

App. 1990).
14. This requirement is a corollary to the Huddell court's holding that in order
lo establish a defective design a plaintiff must offer proof of an alternative
safer design practicable under the circumstances.The Tenth Circuit in Cleve
land interpreted New Mexico law not to require that plaintiff offer proof of
a benefit from an alternative design in order to establish design negligence.
Cleveland, 890 F.2d at 1554. Rather, under New Mexico law, plaintiff must
present evidence "from which a jury could conclude that the risk of injury
would have been avoided by a reasonably prudent person in the position of
the manufacturer." Id. at 1554.
15. There is authority that accident reconstructionists and/or biomechanical
engineers without a medical degree can supply the necessary testimony to
establish the degree and extent of enhanced injury. See, e.g. Seese v, Volk•
swagenwerk, A.G., 648 F.2d 833 (3d Cir. 1981); Bean v. Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft, 440 N.E.2d 426 (Ill. Ct. App. 1982).
16. Obviously, there was some inconsistency in the jury's verdict, a point that
the Tenth Circuit ultimately did not reach because of its conclusion that the
jury should have been permitted to consider the original tortfeasor's negli
gence in determining the crashworthiness liability. Cleveland, 890 F.2d at
1546. In light of the court's ultimate holding, however, it must be assumed
that the court could harmonize the verdict since the court's opinion invites
precisely the type of inconsistency that occured in the Cleveland case.
17. The lengthy opinion was authored by Judge Russell from the Western
District of Oklahoma sitting by designation.
18. The Tenth Circuit found no New Mexico law directly on point and so the
court conducted its own analysis of New Mexico law to arrive at an "Erie
guess." Where there is no authoritative pronouncement by a state's highest
court, a federal court whose jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship
must predict how the issue would be decided by the state's highest court if
, confronted with the same facts. City of Aurora v. Bechtel Corporation, 599
F.2d 382, 386 (10th Cir. 1979). The federal court, in making its prediction
or "Erie guess," "may consider all resources including decisions of New
Mexico, other states, federal decisions and the general weight and trend of
authority." Hartford v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 617 F.2d 567, 569 (10th Cir.
1980); Rigby v. Beech Aircraft Co., 548 F.2d 288, 291 (10th Cir. 1977).
"[D]icta or holding in analogous state court decisions, while not authoritative
expression of the law [of the forum-state] are persuasive and entitled to
consideration by this court." City of Aurora v. Bechtel Corporation, 599
F.2d at 386.
19. Cleveland, 890 F.2d at 1550-51.
20. Cleveland, 890 F.2d at 1546 ("[T]he concept of an 'indivisible injury'
has no place in New Mexico's crashworthiness doctrine.").
21. Justice Jefferson's observation in dissent to the California Supreme Court's
holding that a plaintiff's negligence in a strict products liability case is to be
compared to the manufacturer's design negligence is appropriate here: "What
the majority envisions as a fair apportionment of liability to be undertaken
by the jury will constitute nothing more than an unfair reduction in the
plaintiff's total damages suffered, resulting from a ju ry process that necessarily
is predicated on speculation, conjecture and guesswork. Daly v. General
Motors Corporation, 575 P.2d 1162, 1178,1180 (Cal. 1978) (Jefferson, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (emphasis in original).
New Mexico allows a jury to apportion fault between a plaintiff's negligence
and a manufacturer's strict liability. Marchese v. Warner Communications
inc., 100 N.M. 313, 316-17, 670 P.2d 113 (Ct. App. 1983). A second collision
case is, however, totally different from the case where a plaintiff may have
misused the product. The second collision theory assumes that there may have
been misuse of the product, but that such misuse does not relieve the manufacturer from the duty of design care precisely because such misuse is
foreseeable. See Andrews v. Harley Davidson, Inc., 796 P.2d 1092, 1095
(Nev. 1990) ("Negligent driving of a vehicle is a foreseeable risk against which
a manufacturer is required to take precaution."). The second collision tort fairly
addresses product misuse by limiting recovery only to those damages caused
by the design defect.
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22. The other problem with the court's opinion is that its analysis simply does
not track to the holding. The court recognizes that Duran clearly holds that
crashworthiness and initial tortfeasors are not concurrent tortfeasors. The court
also recognizes that New Mexico's standard of proof for a crashworthiness
case eliminates the potentional for recove ry under that theory where the
injuries are indivisible. These two points should have ended the question
insofar as the applicable New Mexico law was concerned. The court's opinion,
however, reaches out to "read" New Mexico law as permitting a different and
contrary result.
23. 890 F.2d at 1557.
24. Id. According to the court's analysis it should be unnecessary to compare
the original tortfeasor's fault where the design defect caused all of the injury.
The court, however, gives flatly contradictory instructions on this very point
to the district court. In addition, the facts of Cleveland itself, where the jury
did find that 100% of the injuries were caused by the absence of the rear
shoulder harness, the design defect and the court's treatment of that fact, at
least suggest that under Cleveland it may still be required to apportion fault
between design and original tortfeasors even where the evidence shows that
all of the injury was caused by the design tortfeasor.
25. Duran, IOI N.M. at 750. The Tenth Circuit's answer to what would appear
to be the unequivocal statement in Duran was to undertake an independent
analysis of Huddell v. Levin, to determine that the Duran court really did
not intend its holding that the initial and second collision tortfeasors were not
concurrent and therefore, implicitly, one would not compare their negligence
for the enhanced injuries. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit's discussion of Huddell
is demonstrably wrong because not only does that portion of the Huddell
opinion suggest that one would not compare the fault of initial and second
collision tortfeasors, but moreover, the Huddell court's discussion makes clear
that the theoretical underpinnings of second collision cases are fundamentally
in conflict with notions of concurrent fault. Huddell, 537 F.2d at 738-39
quoted in Cleveland, 890 F.2d at 1549.
26. Cleveland, 890 F.2d at 1550-51.
27. The Committee on Uniform Jury Instructions for Civil Cases comments
to the products liability section of the New Mexico Uniform Ju ry Instructions
which discusses Duran also makes no reference to the possibility that fault
should be apportioned between the initial and second collision tortfeasors.
28. This result is in accord with conclusions reached in other jurisdictions.
See e.g., Andrews v. Harley Davidson, Inc., 796 P.2d 1092 (Nev. 1990)C'It
is difficult to envision a situation in which a plaintiff's negligence would be
relevant to the issue of whether a design defect relating to crashworthiness
was the proximate cause of his injuries."); Cota v. Harley Davidson, 684
P.2d 888 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984). Admittedly these cases arose in jurisdictions
where the crashworthiness tort sounds in strict liability, but the results are
consistent with the essential theory underlying second collision liability.
29. See Miller v. New Mexico Department of Transportation, 106 N.M.
253, 255, 741 P.2d 1374 (1987) ("The sole purpose of the waiver in Section
41-4-11 (A) is to ensure that highways are made safe and kept safe for the
traveling public."); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 95 N.M. 56, 59,
618 P.2d 894 (Ct. App. 1980) ("[T]he New Mexico Legislature intended to
protect the general public from inju ry by imposing liability upon governmental
agencies when they fail to maintain safe public highways.").
30. Duran, 101 N.M. at 744.
31. Greeman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897,901 (Cal. 1963);
Stang v. Hertz Corporation, 83 N.M. 730, 733, 497 P.2d 732 (1972) (rec
ognizing that "[t]he basis of risk distribution was that the loss should be placed
on those most able to bear it and they should distribute the risk of loss to
users of the product in the form of higher prices").
32. On remand to the district court, Piper Aircraft raised the issue of federal
preemption, another approach used by manufacturers to avoid their duties to
the public. See, e.g., Kitts v. General Motors Corporation, 875 F.2d 787
(10th Cir. 1989); Wood v. General Motors, 895 F.2d 395 (1st Cir. 1988).
Judge Mechem rejected the defense,but made the necessary findings to permit
Piper Aircraft to pursue an interlocutory appeal The case is now pending in
the Tenth Circuit.
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